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Centennial Reflections on the California
Law Review's Scholarship on Race: The
Structure of Civil Rights Thought
Richard Delgado*
The author reviews one hundred years of the California Law
Review's rich body of scholarship on race and civil rights in an
effort to discern its general direction and contours. Discerning two
broad paradigms-a black-white binary of race and a liberty-
equality divide-he notes that the two not only have been emerging in
roughly the same period but are beginning to occupy the same
territory. After describing the two paradigms and explaining their
origin and operation, he puts forward a prediction for what their
convergence may portend for the future of civil rights thought.
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INTRODUCTION: Two BINARY PARADIGMS OF RACE
Of all American legal journals, the California Law Review has published
perhaps the richest and most extensive body of scholarship on the subject of
race and equality in the country. With foundational articles by Tussman &
tenBroek,1 Derrick Bell, 2 Juan Perea,3 Angela Harris, 4 Ian Haney L6pez,5 and
1. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949) (discussing interpretation of the Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
and pointing out that the tide had been running against equality and in favor of due process. No longer
"the last resort of constitutional lawyers... [and] a dubious weapon in the armory of judicial review[,]
... after eighty years of relative desuetude, the Equal Protection Clause is now coming into its own"
drawing attention to over- and under-inclusive laws and ones that permit too much administrative
discretion).
2. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racism in American Courts: Cause for Black Disruption or Despair?,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 165 (1973) [hereinafter Bell, Despair] (exploring the impact on black defendants of
implicit and explicit racial bias in the legal system); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions,
and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1979) [hereinafter Bell, Usual Price]
(discussing reasons for the slow progress of civil rights law, including the conviction that remedies
should harm no member of the white race); Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Final Civil Rights Act, 79
CALIF. L. REV. 597 (1991) (noting the deterioration of 1960s-era civil rights legislation and positing
that minorities should back a "Racial Preference Licensing Act" allowing firms to discriminate on the
basis of race by purchasing a license to do so, with the proceeds supporting black community
development).
3. Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of
American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213 (1997) [hereinafter Perea, Black/White] (describing
how contemporary civil rights scholarship places the problems of two groups, black and white, at the
center of analysis).
4. Angela P. Harris, Foreword- The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 741
(1994) [hereinafter Harris, Jurisprudence of Reconstruction] (discussing critical race theory's agenda,
including an emphasis on transformation rather than incremental reform); Angela P. Harris, Equality
Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923 (2000)
[hereinafter Harris, Equality Trouble] (describing how race-reform law continually accommodates
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many others over the years, 6 the California Law Review stands virtually alone
in its contribution to and influence in this socially important field.
white supremacy, although the means by which it does so shift with the times).
5. Ian F. Haney Lpez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 1143 (1997) [hereinafter Haney Lrpez, Salience] (observing that race rather than
ethnicity or some other feature best accounts for Latinos' historical experience); Ian F. Haney L6pez,
Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1023 (2010) [hereinafter Haney Lrpez, Post-Racial Racism] (noting that imprisonment rates for
minority groups have increased dramatically since the 1960s, and exploring the possibility that
President Barack Obama's election presages a reduction in racialized mass incarceration).
6. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Race and Races: Constructing a New Legal Actor, 89 CALIF. L.
REV. 1589 (2001) (discussing the role of race in the legal curriculum); Anthony V. Alfieri, Book
Review, Teaching the Law of Race, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1605 (2001) (same); Anthony V. Alfieri, Book
Review, Black and White, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1647 (1997) (exploring critical race theory as an
emerging reform movement with varying goals); Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum
in Legal Education, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1511 (1991) (urging greater incorporation of race and racial
analysis into mainstream legal education); Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733 (1995) [hereinafter Armour,
Stereotypes and Prejudice] (discussing the problem of jurors who harbor unconscious racial
stereotypes); John 0. Calmore, Book Review, Displacing the Common Sense Intrusion of Whiteness
from Within and Without: "The Chicano Fight for Justice in East L.A.," 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1517
(2004) (discussing race, white privilege, and Latinos with black ancestry); Devon W. Carbado, Yellow
by Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 633 (2009) (noting law's role in the construction of racial groups); Robert
S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism,
and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241 (1993) (arguing that traditional scholarship fails to
address the unique legal issues confronting Asian Americans); Richard Delgado, Recasting the
American Race Problem, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1389 (1991) (positing that many of the defects of
liberalism will yield to the insights of critical race theory); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Third
Chronicle: Care, Competition, and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 387 (1993)
[hereinafter Delgado, Third Chronicle] (describing obstacles to empathy across racial lines); Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo 's Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 61 (1996)
[hereinafter Delgado, Eleventh Chronicle] (same); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Essay, Hateful
Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of "A Just Balance" Changes So Slowly, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 851 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Loving Communities] (exploring why hate-speech
reform has been so slow in arriving); Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Essay, Pressure Valves and
Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 871 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves] (discussing common objections to
hate-speech regulation); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-
LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1585 (1997) [hereinafter Espinoza &
Harris, Tar-Baby] (analyzing black exceptionalism and its implications for interracial coalition);
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CALIF. L. REV.
853 (1995) [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Critique of Merit] (charging critical theorists with anti-
Semitism in rejecting a conception of merit that Jews and Asians have used to advance themselves);
Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the
Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775 (1998) (noting
that existing legal structures provide little remedy for disproportionate placement of environmental
hazards in minority communities but that grassroots activism offers promise); Gary A. Greenfield &
Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 662 (1975) [hereinafter Greenfield & Kates, Mexican Americans] (discussing
application of federal civil rights statutes to Mexican Americans); Cheryl I. Harmis, Book Review,
Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 907 (2006) [hereinafter Harris,
Scapegoating Culture] (noting that attempts to remedy racism and inequality often collide with deeply-
held cultural norms described as "racial frames"); Lowell Howe, The Meaning of "Due Process of
Law'" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 583 (1930) (discussing
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Centennial occasions like this one are opportunities to step back and
examine accomplishments like these and to take a broad view of the path one
has trod. In what follows I examine the Review's race scholarship as a whole,
the clause's evolution as a limitation on arbitrary governmental action); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid
Whist, Tonk and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 1401 (1993) [hereinafter Johnson, Bid Whist] (citing variants of poker and bridge,
popular within the African-American community, to explain the need to respect black distinctness in
the process of desegregation); William C. Kidder, Comment, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify
Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite"
College Students, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1055 (2001) (demonstrating racial bias in a common test of
analytical aptitude); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after
Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251 (1998) [hereinafter Krieger, Perestroika] (reviewing the
debate over affirmative action in light of social science evidence); Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese
Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 529 (1984) [hereinafter McClain, Chinese Struggle] (discussing periods of nativism and
resistance toward the Chinese community during the nineteenth century); Dudley 0. McGovney, The
Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 7 (1947) [hereinafter
McGovney, Anti-Japanese Land Laws] (criticizing state laws that deprived certain aliens of the ability
to own farmland); Dudley 0. McGovney, Naturalization of the Mixed-Blood--A Dictum, 22 CALIF. L.
REV. 377 (1934) (same); Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg: Which Came First-
Stigma or Affirmative Action? 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299 (2008) (investigating whether affirmative
action stigmatizes its beneficiaries); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2000) (calling for sociological study of the purposes of
civil rights law); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 687 (2006)
(arguing for language rights as a way to strengthen participatory democracy in mid-level institutions
such as schools and workplaces); Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color
Blindness" Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77 (2000)
(evaluating the effects of addressing racial injustice in colorblind terms); Stephen D. Sugarman &
Ellen G. Widess, Equal Protection for Non-English-Speaking School Children: Lau v. Nichols, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 157 (1974) (discussing school policies that disadvantage non-English speaking
children); Stephanie M. Wildman, Thinking About Race and Races, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1589, 1653,
1656 (2001) (noting "silences, omissions, and strained reasoning" in judicial treatments of race and
racism); Eric K. Yamamoto, Book Review, Teaching Race Through Law: "Resources for a Diverse
America," 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (2001) (urging increased scholarly attention to the legal dimensions
of Japanese internment and reparations for it).
These are but a sample of the many notable articles on race and equality that have appeared in the
pages of the Review since 1912; I introduce a few others later in this Essay. The list does not include
symposium issues on specialized topics such as voting, economic development, or the Bakke decision,
nor articles on narrow technical topics such as Indian jurisdiction or affirmative action. Nor does it
contain many pieces predating the 1960s, when writing on civil rights exploded. See, e.g., Chester
James Antieu, Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 362 (1952) (analyzing non-
Fourteenth Amendment legal avenues to ensure equal protection of the laws); Edward E. Ferguson,
The Califomia Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 61 (1947)
(attacking a 1913 California alien land law as a discriminatory and unconstitutional measure aimed at
denying Japanese-Americans the right to own their own land); Ira Michael Heyman, Federal Remedies
for Voteless Negroes, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 190 (1960) [hereinafter Heyman, Federal Remedies]
(surveying legal avenues through which African Americans could enforce their right to vote); Jacobus
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States-Consummation to Abolition
andKey to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951) (exploring the historical impetus
for the Thirteenth Amendment).
The earliest reference to race or racial traits in the Review is Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Military
Dictatorships in California and West Virginia, 1 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 413 (1912) (noting Mexico's
"penchant for dictators" and observing that not a few U.S. Army generals and mayors exhibited the
same trait in the wild West).
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looking for patterns, signs of strain, significant changes, and theoretical
breakthroughs. I look primarily for broad outline and structure. Thus, I do not
plan to critique any particular article, respond to ones I disagree with, or put
any article or group of them under the lens. Instead, I shall be looking at all of
them at once in search of contours that only emerge on taking this more
encompassing view. In undertaking this survey, I hope to illuminate where we
are today in our thinking on American race theory, and highlight the role that
the California Law Review has played in bringing us here.
What I find, upon examination, is essentially two different binary
paradigms of racial thought,7 one familiar to readers of this literature, 8 the
other less so. 9 The first and more familiar paradigm conceives of American
race relations as occurring within a black-and-white dichotomy. The second
paradigm, which has emerged more recently, focuses instead on the
relationship between individual rights and equality protection. What is most
surprising is not so much the existence of two different paradigms, but rather
that they are nested, with one inside the other.' 0 The black-white paradigm
approaches racial discrimination, a subset of general equality concerns, by
thinking in terms of racial groups, and has resisted approaching race in
individualized terms. The individual rights-equal protection paradigm, which
addresses broader equality issues, thinks in terms of classes of protection, and
had resisted approaching equality in individual liberty concerns. Furthermore,
recent scholarship has (separately) criticized both paradigms for their
balkanizing approaches to equality concerns, offering more unifying
approaches.
I begin by describing the two paradigms and the evidence supporting their
existence. Again, the reader should not mistake my intention. I believe each
paradigm is fully justified and analytically helpful." Attending to each can aid
7. See infra Part II (describing two paradigms of civil rights thought, a black-white binary
paradigm and an equal-protection/due process one).
8. The black-white binary paradigm of race is likely familiar to most Americans, and
particularly to intellectuals familiar with critical race theory. See, e.g., Perea, BlackWhite, supra note
3, at 1214 (noting that the black-white racial paradigm is "one of the most salient features of past and
current discourse about race in the United States"); Espinoza & Harris, Tar Baby, supra note 6, at 1593
(arguing that "[c]ritical race scholars see race as a black/white binary problem" and that this
shortcoming "leads to failure to understand racism").
9. See infra Section I.B, describing a second paradigm that focuses on individual rights and
equality protection.
10. See infra Part III (describing this relation).
11. By "analytically helpful," I mean that each paradigm is relatively clear and well defined, is
a relatively accurate picture of how we talk, think, reason, and decide cases at a given moment in
history, and is to that extent helpful in understanding the social reality of racism in American society.
Paradigms, however, are like frost crystals that disappear on exposure to the sun. As soon as one starts
talking about a paradigm, its days are numbered. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
Labeling a paradigm-giving it a name and speaking of it as such-is thus a sign of its impending
demise. One only speaks of paradigms in the past tense ("the way we used to speak and act"). See infra
notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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in the search for a more just society. 2 Each one is thoroughly justifiable in
light of social reality and the history of race.1 3 Each helps us understand the
case law and the march toward a more humane legal system. 14
After briefly describing the two paradigms, I turn to their relation. I
explain how these paradigms are nested within each other and why I believe
this relationship tells us something about the evolution of thought on a difficult
subject. 15 The California Law Review has published a large and impressive
body of scholarship on race, most of it of the highest order. It has helped to
introduce and critique two important paradigms of modem race theory, and, as
I will argue, may be leading the way to a new paradigm that may help to
transcend some of the problems with current racial thought.
I.
UNDERSTANDING PARADIGMS
A. Defining Racial Paradigms in Civil Rights Law
In organizing ways to think about the points of difference among civil
rights scholars, it is useful to refer to the concept of a paradigm. 6 Paradigms ofracial thought, as I use the term, refer to broad views or schools of
12. More just, that is, from the perspective of those who operate within the dominant paradigms
and have mastered the social understandings associated with them. See infra notes 134-35, 142-44
and accompanying text (describing some of the benefits that accompany this mastery of the most
common binary paradigms of racial thought).
13. Of course, new outsider groups will someday come to question the justifiability of existing
paradigms when they find no room within them for the questions they find pressing. See infra notes
131-53 and accompanying text; Greenfield & Kates, Mexican Americans, supra note 6; McClain,
Chinese Struggle, supra note 6.
14. I explore the mechanism by which ousting outdated paradigms contribute to a more
inclusive legal system in Section I.A infra, by explaining how an inchoate sense of dissatisfaction
always attends recognition of a paradigm, legal or otherwise. When the paradigm is binary, the
discontented faction is apt to be a third group that finds itself marginalized by the current one. See
supra note 13; infra notes 131-46 and accompanying text; see also Tanya K. Hernandez, Afro-
Mexicans and the Chicano Movement: The Unknown Story, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1537, 1544 (2004)
(noting that many Chicano scholars carefully ignore their black roots); Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the
Rhetoric ofAssimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in
an Immigration-Driven Multicultural Society, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 863 (1993) (considering whether
separatism is a viable approach to achieving racial justice in a culturally pluralist United States);
McClain, Chinese Struggle, supra note 6; Rachel Moran, What if Latinos Really Mattered in the
Public Policy Debate? 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (1997) (noting the absence of Latino issues from
social-policy agendas and arguing that this absence "can obscure the special concerns of Latinos and
prevent them from emerging as a complex and compelling people in their own right").
15. See infra Part III.A-C (describing some of the respects in which current racial paradigms
may be breaking down); see also infra Part III.C and Conclusion (describing the gains I hope will
emerge from this inquiry), and in particular note 167 (outlining what a larger, more inclusive paradigm
might look like).
16. See, e.g., THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SciENTIFIc REvOLUTIONS 10 (2d ed. 1970)
(describing the concept of a scientific paradigm as a framework which "implicitly ... define[s] the
legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners").
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scholarship.' 7 They connote ways of seeing something and a propensity to
regard that view as vital and significant.' 8 Paradigms, then, identify issues that
a group of scholars believe important and worthy of study. They also determine
what evidence is relevant and worth studying; matters falling outside the
paradigm are digressions or even pseudo-science or pseudo-issues and not
worth serious attention. 19 Paradigms do permit disagreements, but only within
a narrow, well-understood range. For example, which is preferable: quotas or
targets? Does it matter whether a person has conscious intent to discriminate or
is merely a victim of his or her unconscious stereotype?
Within the contours of civil rights law lies a tangle of complex and
difficult questions. Different paradigms of civil rights law will highlight
different aspects of these field-defining issues. Most readers will think of civil
rights litigation and scholarship as concerned with expanding the right of equal
treatment, especially for African Americans. They will associate it with case
law and legislation ending slavery and segregation. 21 They will think of it in
connection with developments forbidding employment discrimination,22 real-
estate redlining and racial covenants in white neighborhoods,23  school
17. See, e.g., Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1216 (describing legal paradigms as a "shared
set of understandings or premises which permits the definition, elaboration, and solution of a set of
problems defined within the paradigm").
18. See KUHN, supra note 16, at 24-25 ("[D]uring the period when the paradigm is successful,
the profession will have solved problems that its members could scarcely have imagined and would
never have undertaken without commitment to the paradigm."); Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at
1216.
19. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1217 ("[A]s a paradigm becomes the widely
accepted way of thinking and producing knowledge on a subject, it tends to exclude or ignore
alternative facts or theories that do not fit the expectations produced by the paradigm.").
20. For example, the latest edition of Derrick Bell's casebook opens with the following lines:
"For weal or for woe, the destiny of the colored race in this country is wrapped up with our own ......
See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 1 (6th ed. 2008); see also Johnson, Bid
Whist, supra note 6, at 1403 (noting the uniqueness of black culture and institutions); Loren Miller,
Race, Poverty, and the Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 386 (1966) (calling attention to the special problems of
the black poor).
21. See, e.g., Heyman, Federal Remedies, supra note 6, at 194 (assuming that "federal action in
the voting field should be to aid significant numbers of qualified Negroes to avoid obstacles to
registration and voting").
22. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 20, at 149-227 (reviewing the history of black employment
law); Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice, supra note 6, at 743 n.46 (noting the role of African
American stereotypes held by otherwise low-prejudiced people in a variety of settings, including job
interviews and on the street); Sanford Jay Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment,
53 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1965) (discussing developments in the law relating to workplace
discrimination against African Americans).
23. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (striking down a covenant restricting
occupancy of residential houses by anyone other than whites); Harold W. Horowitz, Fourteenth
Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1964)
(exploring constitutional aspects of racial discrimination in selling and leasing "private" housing,
including the obstacle of the state-action requirement); Marshall Kaplan, Discrimination in California
Housing: The Need for Additional Legislation, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 635 (1962) (calling attention to the
need for effective-and additional-state remedies to address housing discrimination).
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segregation 24  and other similar practices. In short, they will think of
scholarship and activism in this area as concerned with broadening the rights of
minorities.
Of course, expanding the rights of one group will often have
consequences for those of another. Vouchsafing the right of a black, for
example, to rent a house or apartment without discrimination may interfere
with the right of a white property owner to rent to a tenant with whom he or she
feels comfortable. 25 Even when protecting the interests of a group does not
require this sort of balancing, important questions may demand attention. How
far does protection for different racial groups extend? 26 Must a claim for relief
brought under an anti-discrimination statute allege intent on the part of the
defendant to discriminate on the basis of race? 27 Do all racial groups have
standing to bring a suit for race discrimination? 28 And how does one measure
the damages resulting from a discriminatory breach?
29
24. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring separate but equal schools
unconstitutional).
25. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20 (holding that a black family's right to occupy housing covered
by a restrictive covenant supersedes that of property owners wishing to preserve an all-white
neighborhood in part because "freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of property
rights was among the basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment"); R. Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CALIF.
L. REv. 87, 87 (1979) (noting that affirmative action programs can sometimes give benefits to blacks
"at the expense of whites who, apart from race, would have had a superior claim to enjoy them");
Wildman, Thinking About Race and Races, supra note 6 (calling attention to role of white privilege
and expectations).
26. For example, does a prohibition on renting to a family of undocumented immigrants, most
of whom will be brown and from Latin America, constitute housing discrimination on the basis of
color? See Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (discussing a housing covenant that excluded black families from a
neighborhood); Bell, Race, Racism, supra note 20, at 425-96 (discussing fair-housing laws primarily
in terms of their impact on black families and predominantly black communities). See also Perea,
Black/White, supra note 3, at 1215 (arguing for extension of the law beyond the black-white paradigm
to include more racial groups, specifically Latinos).
27. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a plaintiff in a racial
discrimination case must prove that the defendant intended to discriminate against him or her because
of race, not merely that he adopted a practice or rule that disproportionately produced this result);
Krieger, Perestroika, supra note 6, at 1229 (noting that much discriminatory social behavior stems
from unconscious mental processes, resulting in "disparate treatment based on race, sex, national
origin, or other factors, even among the well-intentioned"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987)
(discussing the operation of unconscious discrimination and concluding that, "[t]o the extent that [our]
cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists"); Michael S. Shin, Redressing
Wounds: Finding a Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care, 90 CALIF. L.
REv. 2047, 2060 (2002) (noting that many disparities in medical care are not the product of deliberate
design, but can be at least partially attributed to "psychological factors on the part of health care
providers").
28. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (holding that whites may
sue for housing discrimination under a rle that "gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit
who are injured by racial discrimination").
29. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 158-61 (2010) (exploring the constitutional dimensions of using
race-based tables to determine life expectancy and future earning capacity for the purposes of
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Some questions that remain unsettled have to do with the shape and extent
of civil rights protection itself. For example, can a Latino sue for racial
discrimination? 30  Suppose the Latino's lawsuit stems from a type of
discrimination that does not visit blacks, such as looking foreign or speaking
with a heavy accent? 31 What about a black woman discriminated against on the
basis of her black womanhood? Can she sue for racial discrimination, sex
discrimination, both--or neither? 32 Even in this small subset of the crucial
issues in civil rights law, it is easy to see that the frame with which we view the
questions and the field of what we deem important will shape both our answers
and the additional questions we press to ask.
Civil rights law then is a shifting, overlapping collection of responses to a
variety of practical and policy questions. Many of the authors of articles in the
calculating damages in tort actions); Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV.
751, 765 (1991) (questioning whether the judiciary, equipped with current tools, can remedy breaches
of civil rights law because "U]udicial decisions are of limited efficacy in bringing about social
change").
30. See Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1990) (ruling that Latinos may not complain of
jury exclusion based solely on bilingualism); Perea, Black!White, supra note 3, at 1220 (arguing that
"because the Black/White binary paradigm is so widely accepted, other racialized groups like
Latinos/as... are often marginalized or ignored altogether"); Greenfield & Kates, Mexican Americans,
supra note 6, at 670 (noting that some courts may still consider "factors which indicate that Mexican
Americans might be considered 'white' for purposes of section 1981 and 1982" of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866). But see Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (holding that Mexican Americans
may sue for relief from jury discrimination in areas where they can demonstrate that local residents
consider Mexican Americans to be a separate group subject to discrimination).
31. See, e.g., Haney L6pez, Salience, supra note 5; Perea, Black/White, supra note 3. Both
California Law Review articles break new ground in conceptualizing Latino legal rights. See also
LATINOS AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Richard Delgado, Juan F. Perea, & Jean Stefancic
eds., 2007) (discussing discrimination against Latinos based on language, perceived foreignness, and
brown skin); Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 321, 326
(1987) [hereinafter Moran, Status Conflict] (observing that "Hispanics have frequently brought suit to
enforce bilingual education provisions"); Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion: Federal
Intervention in Bilingual Education, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 1249, 1250 (1988) (asserting that the
controversy over bilingual education programs "reflects a battle over the allocation of discretion to
make educational policy"); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American
Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 281 (1990) [hereinafter
Perea, Demography and Distrust] (discussing the consequences for Latinos of "language . . . being
manipulated as a proxy for national-origin discrimination"); Rodriguez, Language and Participation,
supra note 6, at 688 (summarizing local debates about English-only rules); Beatrice Bich-Dao
Nguyen, Comment, Accent Discrimination and the Test of Spoken English: A Call for an Objective
Assessment of the Comprehensibility of Nonnative Speakers, 81 CALIF. L. REv. 1325, 1327 (1993)
("Courts recognize that discrimination against accent may function as the equivalent of discrimination
against national origin .... ").
32. On discrimination against intersectional individuals who are members of two or more
groups, see, for example, Kimber6 Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Policies, 1989 U. Cmn. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (exploring the "problematic consequence[s] of the tendency
to treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis" and noting that
this "single-axis framework . . . is dominant in antidiscrimination law"); Angela P. Harris,
Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, supra note 4, at 767-68; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,608 (1990).
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California Law Review have grappled with questions such as these with keen
intelligence and insight. That literature, however, inevitably exhibits signs of
contention. Because not all authors or courts are by any means in accord on the
above issues, 33 an understanding of racial paradigms can help provide a
framework within which to examine these divergent perspectives. Moreover, as
will become apparent, racial paradigms are far from static. As new cases arise
and new scholarship appears, paradigms interact with one another to reveal new
fissures in our modes and thought and intuitions about how we wish to live our
lives together.
B. An Example of Racial Paradigms: Liberals and Conservatives
To see how paradigms work, it can be useful to examine two familiar
examples, racial conservatism and racial liberalism. 34 Racial liberals believe
that racism is not dead and that combating it is a worthy goal. 35 They believe
that discrimination can take many forms, such as structural, unconscious, and
institutional.36 They believe that most of the problems of African Americans
33. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or, What Is a White Woman
Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) (responding to black-feminist critiques of
intersectionality and essentialism and denying that her own scholarship commits either error); Roy L.
Brooks & Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Binary: Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil
Rights Scholarship, 12 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 107 (2010) (disagreeing that American
race-remedies law incorporates an implicit black-white binary paradigm; asserting that, if it does, the
paradigm is fully justified because of blacks' unique history; that the binary paradigm is readily
capable of expansion to take account of the types of discrimination that visit nonblack groups; and
asserting that this expansion has in fact occurred several times in history); Farber & Sherry, Critique of
Merit, supra note 6; Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories]
(critiquing critical race scholarship and praising the conventional version for its adherence to scholarly
norms).
34. See Kimberd Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1998) (identifying defects in the
accounts of race of both traditional liberalism and critical legal studies). On the conservative position,
see, for example, DINESH D'SOuzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY
(1995).
35. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 20, at 19-72 (discussing various approaches to America's race
problem).
36. See, e.g., Krieger, Perestroika, supra note 6, at 1279 (describing how unstated
presuppositions guide thought and perception, especially in areas such as race, so that much
discrimination "occurs when an individual's group status subtly, even unconsciously, affects a decision
makers' [sic] subjective perception of relevant traits"); Lawrence, supra note 27 (discussing
unconscious discrimination). On institutional discrimination, see Ian F. Haney L6pez, Institutional
Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1843
(2000) (discussing institutional discrimination in the judiciary through the lens of Supreme Court
decisions, and finding that "government actions the Court hopes not to evaluate do in fact impose
severe injuries on minority communities"); William C. Kidder, Review Essay, Silence, Segregation,
and Student Activism at Boalt Hall, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1167, 1173 (2003) (noting the "staggeringly
low" levels of minority representation in the student body at Boalt Hall after the passage of Proposition
209); Amy DeVaudreul, Review Essay, Silence at the California Law Review, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1183
(2003) (same, at the law review).
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are the product of slavery, Jim Crow laws, and discriminatory treatment
extending over centuries. 37 For them, a large body of evidence illustrates the
enduring nature of discrimination, including the strident opposition to President
Barack Obama; society's insistence on using high-stakes tests even after their
validity has come under question; and the persistence of black underrepresen-
tation in many fields, such as the law, and their overrepresentation in the
nation's prisons and jails.
38
Racial conservatives, on the other hand, adhere to a different paradigm
that includes a different set of premises and deems different facts to be
material. They believe that black poverty is largely the product of a host of
cultural factors, such as preferring sports, music, and entertainment to diligent
study; 39 that society is now largely postracial; 40 and that active discrimination
is mainly a thing of the past.4'
37. See, e.g., MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-
BLIND SOCIETY 226 (2003) (asserting that one reason race matters "is that the most important source
of continuing racial disparities in modem America is still the legacy of past patterns of discrimination
and racially coded patterns of disinvestment"); Bell, Despair, supra note 2, at 190-91 (tracing the role
that American courts have played in perpetuating a deeply ingrained institutional racism that began
with slavery).
38. Compare David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 496-97 (1996) (observing
that "African Americans still constitute only a tiny percentage of the associates and partners working
in the nation's largest corporate law firms"), with MICHELLE ANDERSON, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (noting the high proportion of black and
Latino males behind bars).
39. See, e.g., DANIEL MOYNIHAN & NATHAN GLAZER, THE NEGRO FAMILY: A CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (describing cultural patterns in poor black families, including the
relationship between the frequency of broken African American homes and the difficulty that black
children face attaining middle- and upper-middle-class socioeconomic status); see also OSCAR LEWIS,
FIVE FAMILtES: MEXICAN CASE STUDIES IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY (1959) (describing how
fatalism, superstition, living for the moment, and lack of confidence in the value of education and hard
work keep poor Latinos from rising); RICHARD VALENCIA, THE EVOLUTION OF DEFICIT THINKING:
EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 190 (1997) (discussing the prevalence of deficit thinking,
which posits that low-income parents of color typically do not value the importance of education);
Harris, Scapegoating Culture, supra note 6, at 922 (noting a similar tendency in society at large to
condemn African Americans for "maladaptive cultural practices").
40. See D'SOUZA, supra note 34, at 525 ("Racism undoubtedly exists, but it no longer has the
power to thwart blacks or any other group in achieving their economic, political, and social
aspirations."); Haney L6pez, Post-Racial Racism, supra note 5, at 1069 (acknowledging the likelihood
of a partial postracial "transformation" following the election of President Obama, but simultaneously
recognizing that "preservation of the racial status quo" is likely to continue); Kim Forde-Mazrui,
Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and Reparations, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 683, 692 (2004) (offering a moral response to the conservative position by arguing that
"[t]o the extent society participated in wrongful discrimination, society is arguably obligated, as a
matter of corrective justice, to make amends to the victims thereof').
41. See D'SOUZA, supra note 34; see also Richard A. Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future
of "'Affirmative Action," 67 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1979) (pointing out difficulties with the doctrine's
underlying rationale). But see Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things up to Their First Principles:
Reflections on the Values of Affirmative Action, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1384-1405 (1999)
(discussing six principles that can justify affirmative action in higher education); BROWN ET AL., supra
note 37, at 198 (criticizing color-blind approaches to voting rights laws, and arguing that "[w]hites
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Racial conservatives also deem a different set of inquiries to be interesting
and relevant to understanding contemporary issues of racial inequality. They
ask, for example, are blacks interested in science and math? 42 Does their
reluctance to enter into stable marriages account for the poor performance of
some of their children in school? 43 Can the fear that many white citizens feel
toward African Americans be explained by the high crime rates that are
common to many poor black communities, and if so, is that fear entirely
irrational? 44
Intriguing as the liberal and the conservative paradigms are, they are not
the ones I shall be concerned with. I mention them merely because they serve
as familiar examples of what I mean by a paradigm. They have also generated a
great deal of writing, so that it seems pointless to add to it here, although I shall
refer to them occasionally in what follows. 45 Moreover, the sophisticated race
scholars who have contributed to the California Law Review over the years, in
most cases, do not fall neatly into either of these two simple (if not simplistic)
paradigms or schools of thought.
Instead, the paradigms I shall be concerned with are the black-white
paradigm of racial thought46 and an emerging equality-individual rights
divide.47 The first one is likely to be familiar to readers of this Essay; the latter,
less so. Let us now turn to the two paradigms before examining, in Part III,
their relation and meaning.
who insist on color-blind redistricting are really demanding a[] [discriminatory] electoral system that
acknowledges their majority status").
42. If they are not interested, the argument goes, their poor representation in these sectors of the
job market would not bespeak discrimination. See Vicki Shultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender,
Work and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging
Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1073 (1994) (discussing the lack-of-interest defense in
employment discrimination suits).
43. See Moynihan & Glazer, Case for National Action, supra note 39, at 34-40 (exploring the
connection between broken African American homes and the startlingly high rate at which black
children fail the Armed Forces Qualification Test, which "roughly measures ability that ought to be
found in an average 7th or 8th grade student").
44. See D'SOUZA, supra note 34, at 246 (stating the author's conclusion that "whites view
racial discrimination today as a rational response to black group traits"); Jody Armour, Stereotypes and
Prejudice, supra note 6, at 748 (noting that "commentators suggest we are aware of... stereotypes,
but that we experience them as rational reflections of objective reality"); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa
Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 781, 788 (1994) (discussing discrimination based on a group's supposed high rate of criminality
and noting that even some civil rights leaders believe that "heightened fear of black violence is
factually justified").
45. See infra notes 138-39, 151-53 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Section H.A (describing the first paradigm).
47. See infra Section II.B (describing a second paradigm).
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II.
Two PARADIGMS OF RACIAL THOUGHT
A. The Black- White Binary Paradigm ofAmerican Racial Thought
The black-white binary paradigm of American racial thought 48 includes
both a descriptive 49 and a normative element.50 Not all authors who subscribe
to the first, descriptive, component do so to the second, normative one, as well.
And many of those who would agree that the paradigm exists and is a useful
way of thinking about race, divide over its normative consequences. Some,
called black exceptionalists, believe that it is perfectly legitimate to organize
racial thought along the lines of a black-white binary. 1 Others embrace
"differential racialization" and hold that each group is racialized in different
ways.52 Since a black-white binary obscures this basis of differentiation, they
say, it oversimplifies and can lead to multiple errors of analysis and action. 53
48. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1219-20 (defining and illustrating the binary
paradigm as primarily addressing the relations between two racial groups: black and white); see also
Richard Delgado, Book Review, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical
Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1190 (1997) [hereinafter Delgado,
Fifteenth Chronicle] (identifying problems with a binary approach).
49. By "descriptive," I mean passages setting out the author's conception of the paradigm and
giving examples of it. See, e.g., Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1221-52 (introducing the author's
contention that much of today's race literature "comprehends only the study of White racism against
Blacks as the legitimate scope of racism").
50. By "normative," I mean passages condemning or praising the paradigm, or otherwise
pointing out how it distorts analysis. See, e.g., Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1220 (noting
defects in reasoning under the paradigm, particularly when considering the rights of nonblack
minorities, who "often [end up] marginalized or ignored altogether" as a result of the pervasiveness of
the black-white paradigm); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle that Famous
House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 299 (2000) [hereinafter Delgado, Toolkit] (arguing that "[b]lack/white
or any other kind of binary thinking can also warp minorities' views of themselves and their relation to
whites"); Richard Delgado, Book Review, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the
Neoliberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 489, 519 (2004) [hereinafter Delgado,
Locating Latinos] (pointing out drawbacks of black exceptionalism, particularly its tendency to render
"much mistreatment that is not precisely analogous to any [harm] that blacks suffer ... legally
invisible"); Delgado, Fifteenth Chronicle, supra note 48, at 1186 (explaining how the binary paradigm
operates so that "[i]f you're neither, you have trouble making claims or even having them understood
in racial terms at all"); see also George A. Martinez, The Legal Construction of Race: Mexican
Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 321, 336-38 (1997) (pointing out that Latinos
historically were classified as legally white and so not worthy of their own cognizable group subject
to constitutional protectionut unable to take advantage of any societal benefits such a classification
may have brought).
51. See, e.g., Brooks & Widner, supra note 33, at 142 (noting that "it makes sense for African-
American and other civil rights scholars to focus on black/white racial relations"); Athena D. Mutua,
Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White Paradigm, 53
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177, 1192-1201 (1999) (noting the depth of the black predicament); Johnson, Bid
Whist, supra note 6 (asserting that the uniqueness of blacks within American society is a result of
historical forces that shaped the African American community).
52. Under this view, each minority group, because of its own specific situation and history,
requires legal treatment tailored to those differences. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1235-39
(criticizing the notion that a deeper understanding of black-white relations will shed light on the
2012]
CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 100:431
1. Defining the Paradigm
The black/white paradigm of American racial thought holds that, as a
descriptive matter, most civil rights discourse in this country centers around
two groups, considering their experience typical and fundamental. 54 For writers
who subscribe to this paradigm, including scholars, historians, novelists, and
social commentators, those two groups are the white and the black.55 For these
scholars, "race" means black, and civil rights means the relations between
blacks and whites. 56 Although other groups, such as Native Americans, Asian
Americans, and Latinos, have experienced discrimination in this country, the
earliest, longest, and most virulent form of it is that which has visited African
Americans, beginning with slavery.
57
To understand race in America, then, one must begin with the black
experience. The experiences of other groups-for example, Japanese with
World War II internment 58 or Latinos with language discrimination 59-may
experiences of other communities of color); Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 289, 297-98
(discussing the different bases on which various groups within American culture are racialized);
Martinez, supra note 50, at 325-28 (pointing out how Latinos confound easy classification); see also
TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN
CALIFORNIA 4-7 (1994) (discussing the wide variety of racialized experiences among different ethnic
groups in the United States); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s 55 (2d ed. 1994) (proposing a definition of racial
formation "as the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited,
transformed, and destroyed"); Espinoza & Harris, Tar-Baby, supra note 6, at 1596-97 (discussing the
contours of black exceptionalism as it relates to other racial groups).
53. See supra notes 14, 25-32; infra notes 62-67, 71-84 and accompanying text.
54. See generally Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1219-21 (describing the black-white
binary paradigm of race theory); Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 291-306 (outlining the ways in
which binary thinking about race can harm minority groups, even the groups forming half of the binary
association).
55. See Perea, BlackWhite, supra note 3, at 1221-52 (discussing well-known works of
scholarship that analyze racial issues in black-white terms).
56. See id. at 1221 (asserting that literature on race relations "comprehends only the study of
White racism against Blacks as the legitimate scope of racism"); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN
STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 67-74 (2001) [hereinafter DELGADO &
STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION]; see also Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 261 (2006) (noting the importance of preserving black distinctness in integrated settings and
identifying two different strains of racial equality thought: the integrationist view and the community-
centered approach).
57. See, e.g., Brooks & Widner, supra note 33, passim (suggesting that African Americans are
unique and deserving of special attention, particularly because of the role of slavery in shaping the
African American concept of race).
58. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 23 (2001) (observing that "many legal scholars have pointed out
that traditional paradigms of civil rights law contemplate only Black and White racial groups," and that
"[u]nlike African Americans, Asian Americans are often treated as foreigners and may be excluded
from a vigorous application of equal protection doctrines"); JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES:
CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 436-62 (2d ed. 2007) (collecting cases and
government reports on the internment during World War I of Japanese American citizens); see also
McGovney, Anti-Japanese Land Laws, supra note 6, at 26-34 (discussing nativist treatment of
Japanese Americans through the lens of the development of California's anti-Japanese land-use law).
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merit attention, but are nevertheless subordinate to the more foundational and
pervasive variety of discrimination experienced by blacks. Indeed, if one
understands the relationship of blacks and whites and the forces shaping that
relation, one will find a template for understanding the reception society has
afforded other groups lying at the periphery of the American experience.6
2. Diverging Perspectives on the Black- White Paradigm of Racial Thought
The principal exponent and critic of this way of looking at race is Juan
Perea. In a landmark article in the California Law Review, 61 Professor Perea
sets out his interpretation of the black-white binary paradigm and gives
examples of it from the writing of leading race scholars.62 He shows how
writers and jurists who subscribe, consciously or not, to this paradigm tend to
give short shrift to the problems and histories of nonblack groups. 6 3 According
to Professor Parea, they either ignore these issues entirely or assume that one
can understand and address them by analogy to familiar problems affecting
blacks. 
64
Like many critics of the black-white binary of civil rights thought, Perea
does not rest content with merely describing the foibles of this form of thought,
but actively attacks it. For him and other critics, the binary is not just an
interesting habit of mind, or even a perfectly understandable choice to
59. See, e.g., Moran, Status Conflict, supra note 31, at 326-41 (tracing the historical and legal
development of what the author terms "the bilingual education controversy" pertaining to Hispanics);
Perea, Demography and Distrust, supra note 31, at 361-62 (tying the "anti-Hispanic origins of the
official English movement" to nativist tendencies); Rodriguez, Language and Participation, supra
note 6, at 690 (acknowledging the work of scholars like Samuel Huntington, who warn that "American
democracy now faces the possibility of its own unraveling brought on by the failure of an
unprecedented number of recent immigrants, mostly from Latin America, to assimilate linguistically
and culturally"); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of
Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1347 (1997) (noting
obstacles to redressing language discrimination in the workplace).
60. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1221-32 (critiquing this view by explaining that
"Whites can ignore our claims to justice, since we are not Black and therefore are not subject to real
racism.... Latinos/as do not fit the boxes supplied by the paradigm"). But see Brooks & Widner,
supra note 33, at 107-22 (defending this view on the ground that the black experience illustrates
racism in its most pristine form).
61. Perea, Black/White, supra note 3.
62. Id. at 1221-32 (discussing the works of Andrew Hacker and Cornel West).
63. Id. at 1240-52; see also Delgado, Fifteenth Chronicle, supra note 48, at 1185-1289
(demonstrating how the black-white racial binary makes it difficult for nonblack minorities to think of
themselves in racial terms).
64. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1220 (arguing that "the paradigm dictates that all
other racial identities and groups in the United States are best understood through the Black/White
binary paradigm"); see also Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 297 (asserting that "the concerns of
other [racial] groups would come into play only insofar as they resemble, in kind and seriousness, that
one great mistake" of African slavery); Delgado, Locating Latinos, supra note 50, at 519 ("The
black/white binary paradigm of race left Latinos and other nonblack minority groups with essentially
two choices: They could be whites, or they could be blacks.").
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emphasize one set of topics over another, like a torts scholar who focuses on
intentional torts rather than ones of negligence. Instead, the black-white binary
does affirmative harm by marginalizing the problems of other groups and
forcing them to analogize the injuries they suffer to ones that befall blacks.
65
The paradigm also impairs coalitions by encouraging nonblack groups to wait
their tum. 6 6 Further, it obscures how America's legal history of race is a
patchwork of advance and retreat, with one group now progressing while
another moves backward, and the groups trading positions as the interests of
the majority group dictate.
67
Others take the opposite normative position. The paradigm's defenders
include black exceptionalists who believe that the problems of this group are
unique, serious, and deserving of a central place in any discussion of race.68
The category also includes traditional scholars reluctant, sometimes out of
inertia, to extend their analysis to new groups. 69 It also includes those who hold
that attention is a limited commodity, so that pondering the issues facing
smaller or less important groups is a digression from the civil rights
community's main task, namely, solving the problems of the one group that has
suffered the longest, namely, blacks.
70
65. Perea, Blackl/White, supra note 3, at 1220, 1238, 1242 (noting the various ways the binary
can misdirect analysis); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 56, at 67
(arguing that "the black-white binary[] effectively dictates that nonblack minority groups must
compare their treatment to that of African Americans to gain redress"); Delgado, Toolkit, supra note
50, at 1292-99 (same).
66. See, e.g., Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 302-06 (exploring the manner in which the
focus on binary racial paradigms inhibits different racial groups from working together, through an
examination of an exception to this rule where the NAACP and Mexican-American plaintiffs worked
together to combat forced segregation of Hispanic students because of language barriers).
67. For an example ofa nonblack racial group advancing an anti-discrimination cause that was
subsequently championed by blacks, see Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1242-52 (describing the
role that Mexican Americans played in ending racial discrimination by litigating cases regarding
school segregation and grand jury service prior to the landmark Brown v. Board of Education
decision). But see Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 294-95 (observing instances in legal history
where different racial groups have been played off against one another to advance the interests of the
dominant white majority); Delgado, Locating Latinos, supra note 50, at 515-16 (surveying examples
where "progress for one racial minority group often accompanies reversals for another"). On the
difficulty of determining the contours of an identity group, particularly in connection with distributing
benefits, see Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1231 (1994).
68. See Brooks & Widner, supra note 33, at 130-41 (discussing black uniqueness and
defending the related idea that African Americans deserve special attention from race theorists);
Espinoza & Harris, Tar-Baby, supra note 6, at 1596-1605 (defining the contours of black
exceptionalism); Johnson, Bid Whist, supra note 6, at 1415 (asserting that most racial-justice claims
"emanate from the theory that the African-American community is unique in American society
because of the historical forces that shaped it").
69. See Delgado, Locating Latinos, supra note 50, at 490, 497-98 (discussing scholars who
adopt black exceptionalism by default, that is, out of inertia and a sense of familiarity).
70. See id (citing other writers who mention the argument that nonblack actors are unworthy of
affirmative action); Mutua, supra note 51, at 1178.
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Some of these scholars attempt to stake out a middle ground, holding that
the rich body of race-remedies law created with African Americans in mind is
readily capable of expansion to cover the milder troubles that visit, say,
Hispanics or Japanese Americans. Leading defenders of this view include
Angela Harris, writing in the California Law Review, 7 1 as well as Roy Brooks
and Kirsten Widner, writing in the Berkeley Journal of African-American Law
& Policy, 72 and John Hope Franklin, who, as chair of a national race
commission urged at its first meeting that it limit its consideration to the
problems of blacks because understanding those problems represented the first
step toward obtaining the same insights and remedies for members of other
groups.73 According to Franklin, since America "cut its eyeteeth" on racism
against blacks, they deserve to be at the center of analysis, with the others
respectfully taking seats off to the side. 
74
3. Examples of the Black- White Binary Paradigm of Racial Thought
Examples of binary thinking are legion. Perea mentions a number of
prominent figures who, intentionally or not, proceed as though only two groups
were significant for the study of race. 75 On reviewing the race writing in the
California Law Review one comes across many other such writers. Although a
few, such as Ian Haney L6pez and Angela Harris, are for the most part
76remarkably ecumenical, most writers, especially in the early years, proceed
well within the reigning binary paradigm, with, at best, passing references to
the fortunes of nonblack minority groups. 77 Phrases generalizing nonblacks as
71. Espinoza & Harris, Tar-Baby, supra note 6, at 1600 ("The moral claim to inclusion that
African Americans made during the 1960s civil fights movement has become the rhetorical template
for all subsequent civil rights struggles."); id. at 1626-27, 1629-30, 1644 (illustrating this extension of
African American civil rights rhetoric and its potential benefits).
72. Brooks & Widner, supra note 33, at 119 ("The law does not require other racial minorities
to analogize their situation to blacks, but rather to show that they have been discriminated against
because of their relationship to a category larger than blacks.").
73. See Gregg Zoroya, Beautiful Dreamer, L.A. TIMES MAG., Feb. 1, 1998, at 10 (recounting
how a suggestion that the panel's research encompass more than the traditional black-white narrative
aroused the ire of Chairman Franklin); Warren P. Strobel, Panelists Argue over What to Focus On,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at A8 (reporting that Chairman Franklin said that "when it comes to
racial discrimination, the country 'cut its eyeteeth' on the black-white issue"); see also LENA
WILLIAMS, IT'S THE LITTLE THINGS: EVERYDAY INTERACTIONS THAT ANGER, ANNOY AND DIVIDE
THE RACES 244 (2000) (quoting President Bill Clinton on how addressing the problems between black
and white Americans can better enable us to tackle those of other groups).
74. Zoroya, supra note 73, at 10.
75. Perea, Black/White, supra note 3 (citing Cornel West, Andrew Hacker, and various writers
in the field of whiteness studies as examples of prominent figures who employ the black-white binary
paradigm in their work).
76. Haney Lrpez, for example, writes about blacks and Latinos, as well as Asian Americans
and ethnic whites, e.g., Haney Lrpez, Salience, supra note 5, at 1148 n.20, 1162, 1175, 1208-09,
while Harris often considers the problems of nonblack groups and sexual minorities, e.g., Harris,
Equality Trouble, supra note 4, at 1949, 1950, 1953.
77. For examples of writing during this early period that addresses equality issues in
conventional (often black-white) terms, see, for example, Antieu, supra note 6; Greenawalt, supra note
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"other people of color" appear often, as does the word "race" followed
immediately by a reference to a black problem or issue (as though the author
thought the two were synonymous) and no other. 78
Two articles by Derrick Bell in the California Law Review exemplify this
tendency. Perhaps the leading black legal intellectual of his time in the United
States, Bell was mainly interested in the fortunes of his own group. His
casebook, Race, Racism and American Law, is unabashedly Afrocentric
(although less so in the later editions, which devote brief treatment to the
problems of Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, and Muslims after September 11).
79
His two articles in the Review describe America's racial troubles in explicitly
black-white terms, as though "race" were equivalent to "black". He notes the
long history of black oppression 8 1 without mentioning that other groups, such
as Asians and Latinos, have suffered similar oppression, not to mention the
equally bloody and cruel treatment the settlers and U.S. Army inflicted upon
Native Americans. 82 He laments, correctly, how slow the legal system has been
at redressing black injuries, but neglects to point out that redress might have
come earlier had the many minority groups of color made common cause with
each other. 83
84While a number of more recent writers, including Andrew Hacker and
Cornel West, 85 write in similar fashion, many scholars, such as Kathryn
25; Heyman, supra note 6; Howe, supra note 6; Miller, supra note 20; Rosen, supra note 22;
tenBroek, supra note 6. See also Johnson, Bid Whist, supra note 6 (evincing similar focus in a 1993
article); cf infra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that before roughly 1980, these references
were infrequent throughout law review literature).
78. See, e.g., Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1237 (discussing the marginalization of
"other people of color"); id. at 1257-58 ('Other people of color' are deemed to exist only as
unexplained analogies to Blacks."). This is indeed a common practice; a Westlaw search turned up
hundreds of such phrases in the law review literature about race.
79. See BELL, supra note 20, at 684-703 (discussing issues affecting American Indians); id. at
704-14 (discussing aboriginal Australians); id. at 715-18 (discussing the Maoris of New Zealand); id.
at 719-30 (surveying legal issues affecting Japanese Americans, Chinese Americans, and Mexican
Americans).
80. Bell, Despair, supra note 2, at 166 (considering the "view that racial injustice in the
courtroom is caused, not by society, but by the criminal propensities of blacks"); Bell, Usual Price,
supra note 2, at 3 ("Issues of race in America are perceived through a kaleidoscope... [c]onceding
that blacks have been harmed by slavery."); id. at 9 (Part II. The Cost to Blacks of Earlier Racial
Remedies).
81. See, e.g., Bell, Despair, supra note 2, at 171-81, 191-92 (recounting unjust treatment of
black attorneys and litigants); Bell, Usual Price, supra note 2, at 9-14 (recounting the history of
slavery, Jim Crow, and southern resistance to desegregation decrees).
82. See, e.g., PEREA ETAL., supra note 58, at 179-283 (discussing legal treatment of American
Indians and various cases affecting the group's legal rights).
83. See Bell, Usual Price, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that desegregation in the educational
system was "delayed... for more than a decade"). But see Delgado, Toolkit, supra note 50, at 306
(positing success at achieving long-held goals if racial groups "set up a secondary market in which
they negotiate selectively with each other").
84. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL (1992). See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, passim.
85. See CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1993), discussed in Perea, Black/White, supra note 3,
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Abrams, 86 Ian Haney L6pez, 87 and most of the contributors to recent symposia
on Latino-Critical issues 88 or critical race theory, 89 treat race in much broader
terms. A few expressly note that they are consciously proceeding outside the
traditional black-white binary paradigm of race, 90 and short forewords to the
California Law Review symposia promise the same.
9 1
4. Significance of the California Law Review's Pioneering Work on the Black-
White Binary Paradigm of Race
Although scholars have divided over the normative weight we should
place on the black-white binary paradigm-that is, whether it is a good or a bad
thing to proceed in that fashion-no one should doubt that its identification in.... 92
the pages of the California Law Review was a major development. No serious
scholar doubts that before about 1980, practically all race scholarship and most
litigation of racial issues proceeded within this paradigm, and that it remains
deeply embedded in our thinking, if only at an unconscious level.
9 3
Some scholars wish to interrogate that paradigm, believing it hampers
analysis and consideration. Others believe it fully justified by the unique
passim. More recent writers exhibiting the same focus include BROWN ET AL., supra note 37, at ix-x
(explaining that the authors will largely limit their discussion of colorblind racism to that which targets
blacks, because that is where the main problem lies); Brooks & Widner, supra note 33.
86. Abrams, supra note 6, at 1592 (noting that modem teaching materials highlight the
experiences of different racial groups).
87. Haney L6pez, Salience, supra note 5, at 1148, 1153-54 (taking issue with the Census
Bureau and other authorities that treat Latinos as an ethnic group and positing that race is a more apt
lens through which to view the group's history).
88. See Symposium: LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (1997)
(published concurrently in 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998)).
89. See Symposium, Critical Race Theory, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 741 (1994).
90. E.g., Perea, Black/White, supra note 3; Jennifer Chacon, Race as a Diagnostic Tool, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 1215 (2008) (noting the difficulty of expunging race entirely from the admissions
process, mainly due to the personal statement); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial
Preferences, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1139 (2008) (same); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Review
Essay, What Exactly Is Racial Diversity?, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 1149 (2003) (recommending greater
precision regarding types and functions of diversity); Delgado & Stefancic, Loving Communities,
supra note 6, at 860-63; Jean Stefancic, Latino and Latina Critical Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1509 (listing works about Latinos and Latinas, including their
relations with other groups of color).
91. Harris, Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, supra note 4, at 742-43 (surveying alternative
paradigms of race theory literature); Francisco Valdes, Foreword- Under Construction, 85 CALIF. L.
REV. 1087, 1093-95 (1997) (advancing a view of Latino-Critical (LatCrit) scholarship against
traditional race paradigms).
92. Before Perea, a few other scholars had written about the black-white binary paradigm of
race, e.g., Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time, SOC. JUST., Spring-
Summer 1993, at 22, but the first comprehensive treatment of it in the legal literature was his in the
California Law Review. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3.
93. See, e.g., Delgado, Locating Latinos, supra note 50, at 514-24 (detailing some ways in
which traditional race analysis carried out within a black-white binary paradigm can give short shrift to
aims of nonblack minority groups); Delgado, Fifteenth Chronicle, supra note 48, at 1185-1200
(same).
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history of the primary groups, the black and the white, and their never-ending
struggles with each other.94 The descriptive part of the scholarship on the
paradigm, then, seems to stand on firm ground. Its elaboration and description
by Juan Perea and others, beginning with Perea's foundational article in this
Review, very considerably advanced our thinking about the complex world of
race in American society.
B. A Second Paradigm:
The Emerging Binary of Individual Rights vs. Equality-Protection
A second binary paradigm, long latent in writing and thinking about social
issues, is beginning to attract attention and a name. 95 This new paradigm
highlights how attention to human needs, problems, deprivation, and
flourishing may proceed under one of two banners, individual rights or equal
protection. Both approaches aim at the same goal, both result in heightened
judicial scrutiny, and the choice to proceed under one banner or the other is
largely a matter of tactics, ideological commitment, or perceived public
sentiment. 96 As with the broader conception of racial analysis urged by Juan
Perea and others, this second paradigm has begun to emerge as a critique and
revision of traditional scholarship on race.
1. Recent Examples of the Second Paradigm: The Case of Hate Speech
Recent controversy over the regulation of hate speech illustrates the
emergence of this second binary paradigm. 97 Some scholars argue for
protecting minority interests, particularly on school campuses, by invoking the
94. See, e.g., Brooks & Widner, supra note 33, at 135-41 (noting that the African-American
experience is qualitatively different from the Latino-American experience); Espinoza & Harris, Tar-
Baby, supra note 6, at 1596-1604 (defending "black exceptionalism" for the sake of argument).
95. This other paradigm has long roots, having been identified by Laurence Tribe nearly a
decade ago, see infra note 115 and accompanying text, and by Lowell Howe and Tussman and
tenBroek even earlier. See Howe, supra note 6 (noting the early evolution of due process as a
protection against arbitrary treatment by the state); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1 (noting the
relation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, with one now eclipsing the other and at
other times the two trading places).
96. See sources cited supra note 95. Others have noted that one may protect the rights of
minorities-for example to march in protests or be free from excessive restraints-by means of equal
protection or individual-rights analysis, depending on whether one emphasizes the group or the
personal aspects of the grievance. See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448
(1986); ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY (2010); see also Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial
Proxies, 32 CARDozo L. REV. 905, 938-42 (2011) (pointing out how today the pre-emption doctrine
often serves to advance equal-protection values and the civil rights of locally unpopular groups); Noah
Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 673 (2002) (noting a similar feature in feedom-of-religion scholarship); Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960) (pointing out how vagueness
as well as equality and individual-liberty norms often work together to protect constitutional values).
97. See generally MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (discussing the case against racial epithets
and vituperation).
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values of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 Others argue, however, that the best
way to protect minorities from insult and invective is to strengthen, not weaken,
protection for free speech and encourage minorities to avail themselves of it.
99
Minorities should learn to talk back to the aggressor; more speech is the best
remedy for speech that is wrong or insulting. 100 Indeed, if minorities knew their
own history, they would realize how important free speech has been for social
progress and would hesitate to demand rents in the vital fabric of speech-
protection. 10 1 These scholars cite occasions, like Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
speech at the Lincoln Memorial, that moved a nation to tears and that illustrate
the vital role speech can serve for struggling groups. 1
02
Some of the most influential pieces on this controversy, particularly the
equality side, have appeared in the California Law Review. 103 A recent
symposium on critical race theory contained two pieces illustrating the equality
view10 4 and came down on the side of hate-speech regulation. 05 Pointing out
how demeaning speech can easily silence its victim, proponents of the equality
view noted that a rain of insults can end up reducing, rather than increasing, the
net amount of interchange in society. 06 Two note how difficult it has been for
98. Id. at 1, 7, 12-13, 53-88 (discussing hate speech on university campuses); see also
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND 111-18 (1994)
(same). For treatment of this issue in the California Law Review, see Delgado & Stefancic, Loving
Communities, supra note 6, at 854-58 (noting how different scholarly schools invoke liberty or
equality values in the debate about hate-speech regulation); Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra
note 6, at 871, 875-76, 881-83, 890 & n.12 4 .
99. See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE: How AMERICAN
LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER (1992) (defending the free-speech position);
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Hate Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484
(same). But see Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 6, at 881-83 (critiquing the suggestion
that speech has been minorities' best friend). On how the two sets of constitutional values-liberty and
equality--come into play in the controversy over hate speech, see Delgado & Stefancic, Loving
Communities, supra note 6, at 854-58.
100. See Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1517, 1530-53 (1997) (suggesting that hate speech does not "systemically repress the expression
of viewpoints within a national dialogue on race and gender"); Strossen, supra note 99, at 562, 567-68
(urging that the victims simply talk back to the aggressor); HENTOFF, supra note 99, at 101-02, 167
(same). But see Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 6, at 877, 883-85 (doubting the
effectiveness of this response to hate speech).
101. See, e.g, DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note
98, at 205-07; Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 6, at 881-83; Strossen, supra note 99, at
562, 567-78; see also Edward L. Rubin, Review Essay, Nazis, Skokie, and the First Amendment as
Virtue, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 233 (1986) (discussing the role of hate speech in a political system founded,
in part, on virtue).
102. Strossen, supra note 99, at 567-68; see also HENTOFF, supra note 99, at 101-02 (citing
other civil rights figures who moved audiences by inspired advocacy).
103. See Symposium, Critical Race Theory, supra note 89.
104. See Delgado & Stefancic, Loving Communities, supra note 6 (describing some of the
broad social effects of racial language).
105. See Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 6.
106. On how racial invective can cause its target to fall silent, resulting in less speech and
diversity of viewpoints in society than there would be if this form of speech were regulated, see
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, CRT: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 56, at 27-28, 155, and Richard
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judges to escape the influence of a free-speech narrative with long historical
roots.10 7 Others debunk some of the mantras and easy maxims of the free-
speech camp, including the idea that hate speech can serve as a pressure valve
allowing hateful sentiments toward minorities to dissipate safely. 1
08
2. Other Examples of the Individual Rights-Equal Protection Paradigm
Many areas of civil rights jurisprudence exhibit this same dichotomous
quality, with one group of authorities calling attention to the manner in which a
social practice endangers equality or equal respect, and another weighing in for
a liberal or libertarian solution. For example, an article by Robert Post in the
California Law Review questions whether the legal system can or should
regulate hate speech in order to promote the values of democratic dialogue. He
notes, "American courts have consistently opted to protect individual autonomy
against regulations of public discourse designed to maintain the integrity of
collective thinking processes."' 109 Another, in the same issue, by Phillip
Johnson argues against political correctness and group-think and urges greater
respect for individual liberties, including religious freedom and the right to
dissent. 110
Many of the authors on both sides of this fence are fierce champions of
progressive change and consider themselves friends and supporters of minority
causes. But, as we have seen, one group believes that the best way to achieve
this is by framing violations in broad equal-protection terms, while another
favors strengthening the exercise of individual rights and freedoms.
3. Hybridization of the Individual Rights-Equal Protection Paradigm
A number of recent articles, many in the California Law Review, discuss
the emerging individual rights-equal protection paradigm in explicit terms. Two
Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343
(1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Narratives in Collision].
107. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Loving Communities, supra note 6, at 858-59 (explaining
why the judicial paradigm of First Amendment protection resists change).
108. See, e.g., Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 6, at 876-80 (arguing against the
idea that hate speech operates as a pressure valve that makes society safer than it would be if this form
of speech were suppressed).
109. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALiF. L. REV. 2353, 2369 (2000). Post notes that in other settings courts have found similar efforts
"wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at 2369-70. He adds that the argument that a torrent of
racist speech "'distorts' public discussion by perpetuating imbalances of social and economic power"
and rendering women and minorities silent has gained little traction. Id. at 2370. See also Post, supra
note 100, at 1533 (doubting that hate speech, even if concerted, is likely to "systematically repress the
expression of viewpoints within a national dialogue on race and gender").
110. See Phillip E. Johnson, Review Essay, The Creationist and the Sociobiologist: Two
Stories About Illiberal Education, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1071 (1992); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALiF. L. REV. 1 (2006) (noting
obstacles in the way of remedies for broad, structural discrimination).
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articles of my own make mention of it, 11 while Reva Siegel, a former Berkeley
professor, also wrote two articles on the subject. 12 Not to be outdone, NYU
professor Kenji Yoshino offers a thorough discussion of the same approach,
discerning a recent tendency to move away from group-based claims to ones
framed in terms of individual liberties under the Due Process Clause or
legislation aimed at protecting specific rights or interests. 113 He ascribes this
evolution to "pluralism anxiety" and suggests a number of ways of addressing
that anxiety by means of a hybrid form of protection that advances both the
group-protective values of the Fourteenth Amendment and the liberty values of
the Due Process Clause.1 14 In similar fashion, Professor Laurence Tribe used
the term "legal double helix" to describe the equality-liberty dichotomy, which
he also refers to, at times, as a synthesis. 15
Ill. See Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 6, at 874-76, 882, 888,890; Delgado &
Stefancic, Loving Communities, supra note 6, at 851-54 (noting that the controversy over hate speech
features a camp that frames it in equal-protection terms and another in terms of liberty and the right to
say what is on one's mind); see also Michael Barbaro, Behind Gay Marriage, an Unlikely Mix of
Forces, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at Al (noting that wealthy Republican supporters of gay marriage
joined forces with Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo in backing a same-sex marriage bill not out
of egalitarian concerns but because "they were inclined to see the issue as one of personal freedom,
consistent with their more libertarian views").
112. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (positing that the Supreme Court is
beginning to emphasize racial divisiveness in equal-protection opinions); Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning
from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,
44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 276-77 (1992) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning from the Body] (noting that
constitutional equality and liberty claims often present themselves in interconnected fashion).
113. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REV. 747, 748-49 (2011).
Others have expressed dissatisfaction with the overly formulaic structure of constitutional protection of
human rights and urged differing solutions. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 70, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (proposing a sliding-scale approach that would
take into account both the relative suspectness of the class suffering the discrimination and the
fundamentalness of the interest invaded-in effect combining equal protection and due process into a
single standard). As early as 1949, scholars were noting how equal protection and due process claims
came intertwined and how courts could often analyze cases under one doctrine as easily as the other,
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 363-64 (noting that judicial concerns over racism prompted the
Court to shift, in the restrictive covenant cases, toward "not only read[ing] due process arguments into
the equal protection clause but [to go] out of its way to use the equal protection clause in preference to
due process").
114. Yoshino, supra note 113, at 747 (attributing this anxiety to fear of balkanization as the
country's population diversifies); id. at 748, 803 (positing a new hybrid approach combining liberty
and equality under a new banner, dignity, that will be universal in scope); id. at 755 (noting that this
shift has occurred because the Supreme Court today is unreceptive to group-based claims).
115. See Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1897-98 (2004) (calling the structure of constitutional
protection a legal double helix and noting an emerging substantive due process-equal protection
synthesis protecting human dignity); see also Richard Delgado, About Your Masthead: A Preliminary
Inquiry into the Compatibility of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (2004)
(noting how civil rights and civil liberties can easily come into conflict in constitutional discourse and
that this conflict cannot be simply wished away).
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For all these scholars, the upshot is that liberty claims are "inflected with
equality concerns,"' 116 while equality concerns are bound up with protecting
equal personhood, which, in turn, presupposes the ability to exercise a panoply
of rights, including voting, speech, and the exercise of religion. 
117
What we have, then, is a set of overlapping legal norms that aim to
promote human flourishing. The paradigm includes both a liberty component
that emphasizes the importance of human freedom, as well as an equality
dimension that guards against threats to human dignity, self-respect, and
equality of status. The two often appear together because anything that erodes
one is apt to curtail the other. Attention to the dual quality of our system of
human-rights protection enables us to see more clearly what is at stake and how
courts and legislatures at different periods respond to recurring challenges.
Professor Yoshino believes that the judiciary currently is more receptive to
liberty-based claims and that the best that can be done for equality is to forge a
new hybrid that protects that value under a new guise.' 18 The hybrid, while
attending to the two underlying values that characterize the binary (liberty and
equality), attempts to advance those values by, essentially, merging them and
giving them a single new name.
III.
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE Two PARADIGMS
Both the black-white paradigm and the individual rights-equal protection
paradigm are binary, meaning that they include two and only two significant
items and profess to cover the field. 119 Both are, to some extent, irrational in
that each responds to a need to reduce anxiety, simplify analysis, and manage
society's business on grounds that the binary's defenders find familiar and
coherent. 120
Yet, viewed another way, the binaries define rationality, so that they
cannot, by definition, be unreasonable, unjust, incomplete, unfair, or otherwise
116. Yoshino, supra note 113, at 788; see, e.g., Tribe, supra note 115, at 1897-98.
117. See, e.g., Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 106; Delgado & Stefancic, Loving
Communities, supra note 6, at 854-58 (noting that the two sets of norms presuppose each other);
Charles R. Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Hate Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 431 (noting that with campus speech, liberty presupposes equality, or at least a considerable
measure of it; otherwise, speakers will not command equal respect).
118. See Yoshino, supra note 113, at 747-48, 774-87 (noting that the Court now uses liberty-
based analysis to protect many of the interests it formerly protected under the banner of equal
protection); Barbaro, supra note I11.
119. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1219 (noting that the traditional binary focuses
attention on two groups, the black and the white, considering them constitutive of the subject of race).
By the same token, scholars who discuss the equality-liberty divide presuppose that those two values
are the main ones worth pondering in relation to human flourishing.
120. Id. at 1219-32 (noting that the selection of the two groups, while seemingly a response to
historical realities, is, at bottom, an arbitrary decision, particularly if it proceeds in the face of mounting
evidence of its deficiencies).
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seriously deficient.121 Instead, they determine the universe of discourse,
mandating that one examine evidence and seek solutions only within certain
confines and not others. 22 Paradigms are, for that reason, very slow to change.
As Thomas Kuhn points out, paradigm change requires a substantial
accumulation of nonconforming evidence and sets in only when the costs of
adhering to the old paradigm become unacceptably high. 123 A discipline will
then, and only then, consider a new paradigm, such as the hybrid constitutional
approach several scholars have suggested, or the more expansive one that the
discontented Latino-Critical scholars posit as an improvement over that of the
black-white binary.
Intriguingly, the two binary paradigms in the field of civil rights today are
nested one inside the other.124 The black-white binary paradigm of racial
thought is, itself, largely contained within and a subset of the individual liberty-
equal protection paradigm that Reva Siegel, Kenji Yoshino, and I have
outlined. 1 5 The black-white binary usually takes up residence within the
equality-protection side of constitutional human-rights jurisprudence. 126 But it
also occupies, at times, a niche in the due process or individual-liberties side of
the equation. Consider, for example, how Perea's scholarship highlights the
way certain liberty claims-such as the right to speak Spanish or accented
English-are of great concern to Latinos, yet the traditional black-white binary
paradigm can easily render those concerns unredressable. 127
The location of the black-white paradigm within either side of the
equality-liberty dichotomy invites attention, particularly when one considers
that both paradigms are beginning to come under challenge right now. What
does it mean that both paradigms are coming in for interrogation at the same
time? Can one survive without the other? Does one generate the other? How
should a reformer desiring to improve the fortunes of minorities and the poor
proceed? Does one get more mileage by working within one of the reigning
paradigms (black-white and liberty-versus-equality) or seeking a new one?
Which of the two should one change first?
Little that I have been able to find in the pages of the California Law
Review-or elsewhere, for that matter-addresses questions such as these. I
therefore take this opportunity to put forth some observations about the two
121. Id. at 1214-19 (observing that paradigms define reasonable discourse).
122. Id. at 1216 (showing connection between paradigms and selection of relevant evidence).
123. KUHN, supra note 16, at 5, 7, 24 (noting that paradigm change requires the gradual
accumulation of anomalous facts).
124. See supra Sections Il.A and I1.B (identifying and discussing two paradigms).
125. See supra Section ll.B (identifying second paradigm).
126. That is, it concerns itself mainly with equal protection, rather than individual liberty, and
within that framework makes a further refinement.
127. Thus, Perea's groundbreaking work on language rights, see Perea, Demography and
Distrust, supra note 31, would fall analytically within this area, as would Rodriguez, Language and
Participation, supra note 6.
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binary paradigms and what they tell us about social power and authority and
their role in legal change.
A. It Takes One to Know One
(How Recognition of a Paradigm Often Signals Its Impending Demise)
People begin to speak and write about paradigms only when they are
beginning to be dissatisfied with them. 128 Before then, a paradigm is not a
paradigm at all-it is the truth. It is what we mean by doing science, or social
science, or literary criticism, or case analysis, or law. "Paradigm," then, is the
name we give to a mode of thought when we are beginning to be discontent
with it-or, if that is putting it too strongly-when we are starting to see
problems with its coverage or implications.
Naming a type of scholarship or science a paradigm means that one has
begun to divorce oneself from it. A scholar first steps outside the paradigm and
says, in effect, this is the prevailing way of thinking about something (i.e., race)
and it's not working. 29 Something is wrong with it, and not just in a few points
of detail. If that were all that were wrong, we would merely change the
textbooks a little, the changes amounting to a kind of scholarly second edition.
And that is what ordinarily happens with legal discourse. We point out a
problem, show how one group or another is not receiving fair treatment under
it, and propose a small, incremental fix. We show how the case law under
statute X is divided, that neither of the dominant approaches ("models") solves
the problem, and propose a third. We show how our preferred approach best
harmonizes with the dominant policies with which we are in accord. Problem
solved.
In other words, most authors who write about paradigms are really writing
about paradigm change. They are not normatively indifferent to the current way
of thinking about a subject. If they were, they would merely perform "normal
science," as most of us do most of the time.1 30 By designating some aspect of
our conceptual repertoire a paradigm, one is putting it under a lens. One is
inviting others to step back, too, and pay attention to how it is beginning to
produce injustice or miss things that it should consider.
Interestingly, the critic who first points out the flaws in a current paradigm
already has a new one in mind. He or she cannot help this-it is the only way
we can reason.1 31 So, for example, it is no surprise that Juan Perea had in mind
128. See supra notes 51-67, 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing how paradigm change
arrives).
129. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (summarizing criticisms of the binary
paradigm of race).
130. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3, at 1217-18 (describing the term).
131. In this process of reasoning about reasoning, we have only our deepest values, hunches,
and premises to guide us. For example, see text and notes immediately following (discussing reform in
two areas of law).
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a new playing field-Latino legal studies-when he deconstructed the black-
white paradigm. 132 Nor should it be surprising that Yoshino, a gay scholar, was
one of the first to write systematically about the deficiencies of a constitutional
system that protects equality (but not that of gays and lesbians, at least not very
well) and liberty (but not the liberty that gays and lesbians are interested in) in
such fragmentary, theoretically threadbare fashion-and outlined an entirely
new approach to such protection. 133
It is not surprising, then, that the pushback against new paradigms is so
hard and comes so fast. 134 The old paradigm protected some interests and not
others. Facility at working within it brought benefits, such as tenure,
predictable rulings in response to motions to dismiss, and book contracts from
middle-aged editors and publishers.' 
35
But the main point I want to note is that the enfant terrible who brilliantly
and implacably names, ridicules, subverts, and brings down an old paradigm
needs to be stepping somewhere. He or she must be reasoning from some
standpoint or set of premises with which he or she expects the reader to agree,
if only momentarily, for the sake of the argument. And that new paradigm will
one day become the new orthodoxy attracting a new host of enfants terribles
who will name it, patiently explain its inadequacies, and proceed to tear it
down. The relationship between old and new paradigms, thus, recurs
indefinitely. We escape from one mental prison only to another, slightly larger136
one. Someday, one of our successors will deem the more comfortable room
where we have been setting up housekeeping a prison-because, for them, it is
one. We will find ourselves declared defenders of the status quo. 137 Out with
the old paradigm, in with the new.
132. On Latino-Critical Studies, see, for example, THE LATrNO CONDITION: A CRITICAL
READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2011); Symposium, LatCrit: Latinas/os and
the Law, supra note 88.
133. See Yoshino, supra note 113, at 750, 796-800. For a second author's discontent with the
current structure of constitutional rights, see Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 112.
134. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH tN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (critiquing the critical race theory movement in broad
terms); Brooks & Widner, supra note 33 (asserting that the current black-white binary paradigm of
race is fully justified; that criticisms of it are misguided; and that as the need arises it is fully capable of
expansion to include other groups); Farber & Sherry, Critique of Merit, supra note 6 (taking issue with
critical race theory's challenge to conventional notions of merit); see also Farber & Sherry, Telling
Stories, supra note 33 (critiquing legal storytelling in critical race theory scholarship).
135. See Delgado, Locating Latinos, supra note 50, at 496-98 (discussing the appeal of the
comfortably familiar).
136. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1929, 1933 (1991) (describing this incremental process of escape and
confinement); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dilemma
of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639, 650-51, 658-73 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Sixth
Chronicle] (same); see also G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND (J.B. Baillier trans.,
1967) (describing how ideas succeed each other-thesis, antithesis, synthesis-each broader than the
last).
137. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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B. Paradigms and Social Power
Paradigms express social power, if only that of comfortable familiarity
and everyday practice. In law and social science, the power that they express
and create is the power to routinize, as well as to normalize or abnormalize. For
example, the conservative paradigm of racial thought that I mentioned
earlier 138 normalizes the experience of white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants who
work hard at school, have faith in the future, trust most adults and authority
figures, and believe that merit, hard work, and waiting one's turn will bring
their own reward.' 39 Needless to say, a set of legal and social rules that
punishes the opposite forms of behavior (cutting in line, skipping school,
insisting on up-front money for every transaction, and going for broke now)
140
will reward people for whom the first sort of conformity is second nature.
In similar fashion, the black-white binary paradigm empowers, to put it
simply, blacks and some of their allies and fellow travelers. It is a form of black
privilege, admittedly rare, since blacks don't enjoy many other forms of
privilege. It also benefits those whites who have formed cozy relationships with
some blacks, taken the trouble to learn a bit about black history, know a few
black slang words-and can't be bothered to learn much about nonblack
groups, such as Filipinos (what language do they speak, anyway?) or Indians
(aren't they nearly extinct?). 14 1 Latinos are even tougher to figure out. (Aren't
they socially conservative? Aren't a lot of their histories and major literary
texts in Spanish? What does "Aztlan" mean, anyway? And is Puerto Rico still a
colony? Aren't they just an ethnic group, bound together by a custom or two,
like the Masons with their special handshake?)1
42
If, as mentioned, knowledge is socially created and arrives through a
highly social, consensual process akin to mutual recognition and group-
think,143 it is easy to see the role that a paradigm would play in reinforcing
prestige, influence, and authority. In science, many of the most important
breakthroughs come at top schools with the most well funded labs and the
138. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
139. On the Protestant ethic, see, for example, RICHARD BROOKHISER, THE WAY OF THE
WASP (1991) (discussing the habits and predilections of this group); MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Dover ed. 2003) (1904-05).
140. See LEWIS, supra note 39 (explaining a supposed culture of poverty that traps some
minority families in failure and fatalism); MOYNIHAN & GLAZER, supra note 39; VALENCIA, supra
note 39 (showing how such pernicious attitudes pervade schools and shape the relations of some
middle-class schoolteachers with students of color).
141. See Delgado, Locating Latinos, supra note 50, at 496-501.
142. Id These questions correspond to a few of the simplistic generalizations according to
which some intellectuals justify their own refusal to take this group seriously and make the effort to
learn about its culture, history, and hopes.
143. See KUHN, supra note 16 (noting how paradigms of scientific knowledge develop,
operate, and eventually recede in favor of others); see also PETER L. BERGER & PAUL LUCKMANN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966) (offering a sociological description of this process).
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highest paid researchers. 144 In social analysis, pretty much the opposite is true.
(Think: Howard Zinn at Boston University, where he was among the lowest
paid faculty members of his division, 145 although perhaps the most widely read
and respected; Derrick Bell, who was essentially fired from Harvard;146 and
Karl Marx, sitting at a table in the British Museum, his bag lunch at his side).
Paradigm change may not require personal or professional discontent, but
it helps. As I mentioned on another occasion, change often begins with small
discontented groups who are willing to challenge the members of the next-
larger groups. 47 Black women challenge white women, pointing out how the
feminist revolution has not benefited all women equally. The white women are
surprised. They had thought themselves on the side of the angels, yet now find
themselves accused of some of the same mistakes they have been charging
patriarchal men with-taking things for granted, seizing the baseline, punishing
nonconformity, and the like. 1
48
We only escape from one jail to a slightly larger one, however. Soon the
black women will find themselves under siege by black women who are gay, or
who are Latina, or who like Sarah Palin, or who believe in one Christian God,
and want that set of issues to be placed on the feminist agenda. 1
49
It seems, then, that paradigms emerge "from below"--when some group,
feeling beleaguered and ignored, wants a new structure of thought that will
respect its interests better than the old one. This is particularly true in the world
of social thought, and only a little less true in hard science.
C. On Finding Two Nested Paradigms in a Single Area of Discourse
When, as now, two paradigms are coming into question at the same time
with one located largely inside the other, something unusual is going on.1 50
To see this, consider the liberal paradigm mentioned early in this Essay. 151
That paradigm, under pressure from the right,152 split into a traditional faction
144. See, e.g., UC Berkeley's 22 Nobel Prize Winners, http://berkeley.edu/news/features/nobel,
U.C. BERKELEY (last visited Dec. 28, 2011); Nobel Laureates, HARvARD U., http://www.harvard.edu/
nobel-laureates (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
145. See Helen Epstein, Crusader on the Charles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1989,
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/23/magazine/crusader-on-the-charles.html (describing Zinn's
career).
146. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Comments Concerning Race Divide Harvard Law School, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at A14 (describing the circumstances of Bell's departure from Harvard Law
School, where he had been the first black professor to receive tenure); THE DERRICK BELL READER
12-13 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005) (same).
147. Delgado, Sixth Chronicle, supra note 136, at 665-73.
148. Id.
149. Id; see also Johnson, supra note 110 (discussing how current norms of scholarship
exclude discussion of Creationism).
150. See text and notes immediately infra, employing a temperature analogy to forecast the
consequences of a double dose of discontent. It is relatively rare for two paradigmatic revolutions to
intersect. When they do, it behooves us to pay attention to what the intersection heralds for the future
of legal thought in the area in question.
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that advocates the standard remedies (mainly punishing treating likes unlike),
and a set of closely related critical factions, including critical race theory.' 
53
Latinos and other nonblack groups believe that both left-wing factions, the
traditional and the critical, have been ignoring them, marginalizing their
concerns by adhering to some version of the black-white binary paradigm of
race. The California Law Review has been the birthplace for this reform
movement, with the publication of key articles such as those of Juan Perea and
Leslie Espinoza and Angela Harris, discussed earlier.'
1 54
At the same time, several scholars, including one who is liberal but
racially unaligned, point out a second paradigm that is no longer working
well. 155 For these scholars, it is time to retire or modify the bifurcated treatment
that conventional constitutional scholarship deploys in cases where human
rights are being trammeled but the law has no single obvious way of redressing
them. Take, for example, the rights of gays and lesbian couples to marry or
claim a federal tax deduction. 156 Should those claims proceed under equal
protection or due process? Depending on which feature of them-the group or
the individual aspect--one wishes to highlight, they could proceed under either.
The same is true of police profiling of Muslims,1 57 requiring Latinos to speak
only English on a job that does not entail meeting the public, 158 and many other
situations.
151. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, Critique of Merit, supra note 6 (criticizing critical race
scholarship as itself unfair to Jews); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, No MERCY: How
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA (1995)
(discussing the rise of conservative movements).
153. On critical race theory, see Symposium, Critical Race Theory, supra note 89;
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
On the traditional view of equal protection as guaranteeing like treatment of like classes, see Tussman
& tenBroek, supra note 1.
154. See Perea, Black/White, supra note 3; Espinoza & Harris, Tar-Baby, supra note 6, at
1596-1604 (setting out the case for and against black exceptionalism). A sister review, the Berkeley
Journal of African-American Law & Policy, published a second defense of black exceptionalism and
the traditional binary paradigm. See Brooks & Widner, supra note 33.
155. See Yoshino, supra note 113. Yoshino's writings have, to date, mainly concerned
nonracial matters. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
RIGHTS (2006) (discussing sexual minorities); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J.
1835 (2005) (discussing law and literature).
156. See ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND THOSE
WHO CARE ABOUT THEM) (2008) (discussing a host of issues confronting gays and lesbians under
traditional heterosexually-normed law); Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 605 passim.
157. This could take the form of a group-based equal-protection claim or one for violation of
the individual right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, A
Rage Shared by Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2004) (discussing surveillance of people who look
Middle-Eastem in the wake of 9/11).
158. This claim, too, is susceptible to framing in either set of terms, See, e.g., LATINOS AND
THE LAW, supra note 31, at 206-302 (describing bilingualism and language rights); see also
Rodriguez, Language and Participation, supra note 6 (discussing bilingualism as a broad process
right); Cameron, supra note 59 (same).
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Scholars who point out that the current paradigm of constitutional law is
weak and confused on issues such as these are calling for a sharper form of
analysis (referred to as "hybrid" 159) suited to analyze, sort, and redress complex
grievances like these. Since many of these grievances are the very ones that
ignored groups marginalized by the black-white binary paradigm are
complaining about, the two sets of paradigm-anxiety intersect. That is why one
paradigm (the black-white paradigm) is starting to come under attack just as
another (the constitutional-path paradigm) is, as well.
One can easily envision a point sometime in the future, perhaps soon,
when the two paradigms, which address similar and overlapping concerns,
dissolve into a new approach capable of addressing the sorts of problems they
now ignore or treat poorly.
Examples of such paradigm-shifting points include, in the development of
strict scrutiny, Carolene Products,160 and, earlier, Justice Harlan's dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson,161 which led to Brown v. Board of Education162 and the
rejection of separate but equal. In modem times, I would name the publication
of Derrick Bell's article on Brown v. Board of Education and its announcement
of an interest-convergence principle operating in racial analysis. 163 I would also
name a pair of articles calling attention to the role of unconscious
discrimination, one of them in the California Law Review. "' And I would
name the Tussman and tenBroek article that laid the basis for seventy years of
development of equality and equal protection jurisprudence.' 65 Perhaps the
development of legal storytelling and narrative analysis, as well. 166 But theprecise details of the new paradigm remain, at this point, a matter of conjecture.
159. See supra notes 113-14, 118 and accompanying text.
160. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (positing that strict
scrutiny might be appropriate in cases concerning discrete, insular minorities whose interests could
easily be overlooked in the legislative arena).
161. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Constitution is colorblind and cannot tolerate the caste-creating aspects of a state law that required
blacks to ride in railroad cars separate from those reserved for whites).
162. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting school-assignment rules that
required separate schools for black and white children).
163. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
164. Krieger, supra note 6; Lawrence, supra note 27.
165. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1 (observing how judicial concern over minority rights
prompted the shift from due process to equal protection as a vehicle for protecting those rights). Once
again, marginalized segments within the minority community are dissatisfied with the quality of
protection they receive under the current system. Right on schedule, scholars have begun developing
new paradigms for addressing these issues, see supra Sections 1I.A and IIB, in an unending process
that gives the structure of civil rights its recursive character, with periodic expansions, contractions,
shifts, and splits.
166. See Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (analyzing the legal
storytelling movement); Delgado, Third Chronicle, supra note 6; Delgado, Eleventh Chronicle, supra
note 6 (illustrating this approach); see also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L.




WHEN PARADIGMS TUMBLE-THE ROLE OF THE CALIFORNIA LA WREVIEW
When writers begin naming and demonstrating the deficiencies of a
reigning paradigm-the way we always used to speak and think-an immediate
commotion often sets in. As mentioned, paradigms flirt with and do business
with social power, so that they generate investments on the part of their
backers. Even those with little investment in the paradigm and its associated
machinery (case law, the division of academic departments, tenure, course
syllabi, textbooks, book series, etc.) may find the old ways of speaking, writing,
and teaching comfortable and familiar. Thus, the old ways generate an inertial
momentum of their own. Usually it is outsiders, persons for whom the familiar
ways are not the best, or at least not the best imaginable, who name and
challenge an existing paradigm.
When two paradigms come under attack at the same time, an area of
discourse is a goner. Major change is on the horizon. This is particularly so if
the critiques are credible and well substantiated, as Perea's and Yoshino's are.
It is not enough to say, "I am post this or that," as some camp followers of the
latest academic trend do. One needs to show why the old paradigm is
inadequate-that it overlooks important social groups and alignments of power,
is unattractive to the judiciary as a whole, or is otherwise out of keeping with
the times. That is what the many critics discussed in these pages do.
167
As we have seen, the California Law Review has played a major role in
both the development of, and the critique of, each of the two reigning
paradigms of racial thought. If things are poised for major change--one that
has been overdue for some time-the Review will have performed a vital part
in ushering it in.
167. What will the new paradigm look like? Will it include both race and class? See RICHARD
KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY (1997). Races other than the black and white? What about discrimination
on the basis of religion, especially minority religions like Islam? Will it find a place for discrimination
on the basis of disability and sexual orientation? Will it include new forms of judicial review and tiers
of scrutiny? Time limits (such as 25 years) and grandfather clauses? Will it be simple (a unified theory
of discrimination) or complex, with differentiated analyses corresponding to different groups and
settings? My guess (hope, really) is that it will include all these matters and in unified fashion.
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